An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. A proposal of employment from a recruiter, probably a female agent, operating from China. The opportunity to earn around £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of geopolitical reports for a Chinese company peppered with “non-public” or “insider” information. Payment in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It might appear obvious, in this scenario, that something about this method would be suspicious. Nevertheless, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security continues to view it valuable to use recruitment consultants to attempt this – prompting MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity online.
Large-Scale Approaches on Professional Networks
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of ten thousand over the preceding 30-month period, attempting to obtain political, industrial, defense and scientific classified information. However a new campaign aimed at politicians and Westminster has led the spy agency to act again.
An espionage warning was distributed on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords counterpart: a single slide after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the typical style of UK security services, there was no official release of the security advice from the agency or the interior ministry. Yet the agency was aware its advisory document would become public once it was sent electronically out to parliament. Sharing it in the media helps the wider public better identify interactions with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the impact of flushing out additional details from within Westminster, although that is not the agency's primary purpose. The agency wants people in public life to understand that just because exchanges on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, although the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
The two had been accused of working for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but inability to complete a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Laws and China's Long-Term Interests
The law has now been changed, and the MI5 slide includes a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in spying operations face significant legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if a person participates in conduct that could potentially “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet the Chinese government is particularly focused in parliament: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the Britain's China policy on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Methodological Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like China’s export intelligence collection methods and the size of its spy network is enormous, employing 300,000 people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, commented it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is prepared to cultivate contacts over the extended period and at times even the agencies have found it difficult to differentiate genuine connections and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for which details is deemed to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on this week, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may mean an individual rapidly marginal becomes important.
Another way to consider the continuous efforts at secret intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the Western nations at a threshold under the point of direct conflict. China has increased its cyber operations, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the another operation breach of millions internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in relentless attempts to identify covert sources on UK politics via digital means because it wants to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.
